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GENE SHREVE*
Religion, Science and the Secular State: Creationism
in American Public Schoolst
This Article examines the current debate whether creationism
may be taught in American schools given the constraints of the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The
author considers some of the social and political consequences of the
U.S. Supreme Court's leading cases. The article concludes by ques-
tioning whether the Supreme Court has succeeded in justifying its
restrictive decisions in this controversial area.
Law may be seen as a series of expedients to influence, punish,
reward, and authoritatively explain human behavior. Law tells us
how to behave and places the assorted coercive powers of government
behind that directive. Our governments compel us to follow the rule
of law.' They sweeten their commands by assuring us that their laws
will be uniformly applied 2 and that they will in their application pro-
mote the public good.3 Their laws will, that is to say, create a good
society. This assumes that it is possible to find a moral compass to
tell good from bad in society-to know what good and bad people do.
* Richard S. Melvin Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. I am
honored to serve as a United States Reporter for the 18th Congress of International
Academy of Comparative Law on Topic I B.: General legal theory: Religion and the
secular state. This paper would not have been possible without the prolonged and
patient assistance of two faculty colleagues who are luminaries in their fields. My
deepest thanks go to Dan Conkle for his guidance on the Establishment Clause and to
Kevin Brown for his guidance on public education and the Constitution. Any errors
are mine alone.
t DOI 10.5131/ajcl.2009.0041.
1. See BRILAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAw: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY
(2004).
2. "For any well functioning governance, it is as important that decisions seem
appropriate as well as that they are appropriate. This is especially true for the courts,
which are supposed to dispense even-handed justice." Kent Greenawalt, The Endur-
ing Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 982, 999 (1978). In addition,
see LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT
(2005).
3. However open to dispute, these assurances are made by every government to
its citizens. In totalitarian regimes, they may be associated with notions of propa-
ganda and ideology. DENNIS H. WRONG, POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES, AND USES 96
(1995).
51
HeinOnline -- 58 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 51 2010
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
Religion appears capable of supplying law's moral compass.4 Or
moral guidance as firm and definitive may derive from a secular
source. This essay will examine American law's commitment to the
secular approach with particular reference to the current debate over
creationism in the public school curriculum.
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Ratified in 1791, the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution
begins: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . ."5 This is termed the Establishment Clause.6 The U.S.
Supreme Court has extended Establishment Clause constraints on
state governments and their subdivisions.7 The Clause is thought to
prevent government favoritism of religious over secular concerns or
favoritism of one religion over another.8
Among the numerous settings for Establishment Clause litiga-
tion,9 have been the religion-based attempts by state and local
governments either to block teaching of the biological theory of evolu-
tion 10 in public schools or to diminish the effects of such teaching.
Evolutionary theory provoked religious opposition from many Chris-
tians because it conflicted with the biblical account of living things
created by God in unchanging form," and because it suggested the
age of the earth was far greater than theologians estimated by using
4. Thus, "principled constitutionalism" can be "constructed on the foundation of
institutionalized religion." Larry Cata Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An In-
troduction to a New Global Legal Ordering, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUDIES 85, 170(2009).
5. Continuing, the amendment states "or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
." This notion of religious freedom, that one can practice his or her religion of choice
without government interference, has enjoyed a robust constitutional history compa-
rable to that of the Establish Clause. See PETER K. ROFES, THE RELIGION
GUARANTEES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 123-177(2005).
6. A related provision in Article VI of the Constitution states: "no religious Test
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States." However, the subsequent ratification of the First Amendment proba-
bly eclipsed this restriction. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
7. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
8. Daniel 0. Conkle, Establishment Clause, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 924 (2nd Ed. 2000).
9. Important questions have arisen concerning the effect of the Clause on prayer
in public schools, public financial assistance to religious institutions, public religious
displays, religious content in public oaths of allegiance, and in many other settings.
For comprehensive surveys, see RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NoWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 21.3-21.5(e) (4th ed. 2008); Rofes, supra note 5, at 29-112.
10. "The theory of evolution is . . . the central idea in modern biology." DYLAN
EVANS & HOWARD SELINA, INTRODUCING EVOLUTION 3 (2001). Charles Darwin (1809-
1882) sought to answer two questions: Did species change-evolve-and, if so, how
and why did change occur? There were numerous scientific observations prior to Dar-
win's work on the possibility of evolution. His most important contributions came in
his answer to the second question, which he termed "natural selection." Id. at p. 25.
11. "And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field, and
every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them:
52 [Vol. 58
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the Bible. 12 This religious movement in opposition to evolution is
often called creationism.13
Establishment Clause cases in this area represent three historical
stages.
The earliest form of government opposition, and the most direct
expression of creationism, was simply to ban teaching the scientific
theory of evolution in American public schools. In the 1968 case, Ep-
person v. Arkansas,14 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this violated
the Establishment Clause. An Arkansas statute that forbade teach-
ing biological evolution in public schools was found unconstitutional
by the Court because its purpose was to advance a particular relig-
ion's view.15
Creationists responded to the Epperson decision with a new ap-
proach. "The second generation of creationism statutes conceded that
evolution could be taught, but required that creationist theory be
given equal time."16 These initiatives, termed "balanced treatment"
by their proponents, were brought to a halt by the Supreme Court in
1987. Edwards v. Aguillard 7 extended the Court's Epperson ruling,
striking down a Louisiana statute entitled "Balanced Treatment for
Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruc-
tion." Once more the Court found a religious purpose in the
and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof." Gene-
sis 2:19 (King James Version).
12. Christian theologians computing all of the time mentioned in the bible deter-
mined the age of the earth to be about 6000 years. "If the Bible was literally true . . .
[tihis was nowhere near enough time for evolution to take place." Evans & Selina,
supra note 10, at 12.
13. "Creationism is the belief that plants and animals were originally created by a
supernatural being substantially as they now exist. Proponents of creationism today
are primarily evangelical Christians who adopt a literal reading of the book of Gene-
sis of the Bible." John G. West, Creationism, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 706 (2nd ed. 2000). By this view, "Scripture" is taken "to be a special
revelation from God himself, demanding our absolute trust and allegiance." Alvin
Plantinga, When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible, INTELLIGENT DE-
SIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS 113 (Robert T. Pennock, ed. 2001).
14. 393 U.S. 97.
15. For discussions of Epperson, see DANIEL 0. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THE RELIGION CLAUSES 170 (2nd ed. 2009); West, supra note 13, at 706; ROTUNDA &
NowAK, supra note 9, at 21.5(d).
16. STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 183 (2nd ed. 2006).
17. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). For discussions of the Edwards case, see Conkle, The
Religion Clauses, Id. at 170-171; West, supra note 13, at 707-708; Rotunda & Nowak,
supra note 9, at 21.5(d). In Edwards, as in Epperson,
"[t]he Court found that the challenged laws were intended to protect and
further a religious understanding of human origins. As such they had the
purpose of advancing and endorsing religion over irreligion, thereby confer-
ring benefits on religion that were deliberately discriminatory and
constitutionally impermissible.
Conkle, id, at 169-170.
2010] 53
HeinOnline -- 58 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 53 2010
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
legislation. Edwards currently provides the Supreme Court's last
word on religion in the public school curriculum.
To some religious believers, [Edwards] embodies the
hostility to all things religious to which the contemporary
Court has led the Constitution, the regrettable triumph of
secularism over faith. To others, such a result represents
nothing more than the reality that the Constitution insists
that religiously driven messages be disseminated in venues
other than the American public school. These differing cul-
tural perspectives likely will not reconcile anytime soon. For
now, however, [Establishment Clause] principles cast
shadows of constitutional doubt over efforts to use the insti-
tutions of public education to inculcate students with a view
of mankind's origins that comports with the view espoused
by religious teachings.' 8
The creationist response to Edwards has been to regroup once
more. This latest initiative has been to offer in the public school cur-
riculum a theory in opposition to evolution called Intelligent Design.
Intelligent Design is like earlier creationist positions in rejecting bio-
logical concepts of evolution and natural selection. It is careful,
however, to avoid reference to biblical sources or to the existence of a
divine supernatural being. Proponents advance Intelligent Design as
a rival scientific theory.' 9 It rests on "the argument that certain fea-
tures of the natural world are so complex and intricately put together
that they must have been deliberately fashioned."20 The legitimacy of
intelligent design is debated within the scientific community,2 1 while
its constitutional viability is debated among legal scholars. 22 The Su-
preme Court has not yet considered a challenge to insertion of
18. Rofes, supra note 5, at 56.
19. Intelligent Design proposals come in various forms, including efforts by school
boards to directly advance the theory in science classes beside traditional scientific
renditions of evolution theory, incorporation of Intelligent Design precepts in state
science standards, and the placement of disclaimers in science textbooks.
Gey, supra note 16, at 184.
20. Margaret Talbot, "Darwin in the Dock," The New Yorker 66 (Dec. 5, 2005).
21. E.g., compare Phillip E. Johnson, Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of
Naturalism, INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICs 59-76 (Robert T. Pen-
nock, ed. 2001) (defending Intelligent Design as a legitimate scientific theory) with
Robert T. Pennock, Naturalism, Evidence, and Creationism: The Case of Phillip John-
son, INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITIcs 77-97 (Robert T. Pennock, ed.
20001) (questioning the same).
22. E.g., compare David K. DeWolf, Stephen C. Meyer & Mark Edward DeForrest,
Teaching the Origins Controversy: Science, Or Religion, Or Speech, 2000 UTAH L. REV.
39 (2000) (arguing that Intelligent Design can be taught in public schools without
offending the Establishment Clause) with Matthew J. Brauer, Barbara Forrest &
Steven G. Gey, Is It Science Yet? Intelligent Design Creationism and the Constitution,83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (2005); Jay D. Wexler. Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment:
Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751 (2003)(arguing the same to be unconstitutional).
54 [Vol. 58
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Intelligent Design into the public school curriculum. But lower courts
have struck down such initiatives on Establishment Clause grounds,
relying upon Edwards.23
II. THE VIEW FROM THE OUTSIDE
Little of the U.S. Constitution is explicit or self-applying. The Su-
preme Court derives much of its considerable power from its
professed need to expound on the meaning of a few words of constitu-
tional text in order to resolve particular controversies before it.24 The
Supreme Court thereby makes most of our constitutional law though
judicial doctrine and in increments-determining the rational effect
of prior cases on new case facts. This means that the constitutional
law making process of the Court moves in starts and stops as the
court grapples with the facts-including the quirks and idiosyncra-
sies-of each new controversy.
The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence bears this out.
The only meaning clear from the text alone is that it bars creation of
an official government religion. "Beyond the consensus on this indis-
putable proposition, however, much remains up for grabs among the
justices regarding the precise contours of the anti-establishment
principle." 25 Doctrine applicable to the creationism question suffers
from uncertainties of constitutional history26 and from the failure to
adequately define "religion."27 It is impossible to grapple with these
23. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000); Kirtzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp.
2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005); Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D.
Ga). These cases are examined in Gey, supra note 16, at 185-186. Kirtzmiller, involv-
ing an attempt by a local Pennsylvania school board to introduce Intelligent Design
into the science curriculum, has received the most attention. For a fascinating ac-
count of the trial there, see Talbot, supra note 20.
It should be noted that the result shared by Epperson, Edwards, and the cases
above-that religious purpose in public school teaching violates the Establishment
Clause-might suggest far more clarity and continuity in judicial doctrine than actu-
ally exists. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text, infra.
24. In the landmark case, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the
Supreme Court claimed the power to invalidate an act of Congress on this basis.
25. Rofes, supra note 5, at 30.
26. One commentator has lamented
the selective and self-contradictory use of historical evidence by advo-
cates on both sides. In no area of American constitutional law have judges
and scholars more consistently resorted to historical materials as the founda-
tion of their analytical structures than in the church-state area. Yet, to date,
they generally have used these materials in a way that has obscured the
meaning of the First Amendment's provisions on religion.
John Sexton, Of Walls, Gardens, Wildernesses, and Original Intent: Religion and the
First Amendment, AMERICA IN THEORY 85 (Leslie Berlowitz, et al. eds. 1988).
27. RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., STEVEN G. GEY, LYRISSA C. BARNETT LIDSKY &
CHRISTINA E. WELLS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND THEORY 758 (2008) ("The
Supreme Court has never provided a definitive definition of the term 'religion' in its
Establishment Clause decisions."); Wexler, supra note 22, at 815 ("Courts and com-
mentators have spilled much ink over the question of how to define 'religion' for First
2010] 55
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interior concerns of the structure and fabric of Establishment Clause
doctrine28 within the space permitted here. But I can take a different
perspective that my international readers may find at least as inter-
esting: a view from the outside. I will devote the balance of the paper
to some thoughts on the larger social, political, and legal significance
of the Supreme Court's creationism cases.
While religious antagonism toward scientific theory has long ex-
isted,29 science has never been antagonistic toward religion. Rather it
is indifferent to it, as it is to all moral concerns. Natural science is
preoccupied with the physical world. It is usually enough for scien-
tific theory to state and support a causal rule, viz, to explain why a
particular phenomenon occurs and will repeat itself.30 Lofty moral
questions-religious or secular-have no place in science. 31 They are
uninteresting to scientists because they "cannot be tested and proved
in the same way that an hypothesis in physics or chemistry can be
falsified or verified."3 2
Consider the Copernican Revolution. The discovery that the
earth was merely one of several planets revolving around the sun as-
saulted the belief in "the earth as the unique and focal center of God's
creation."33 While they were denounced as satanic figures, neither
Copernicus nor Galileo set out to affect religion. Copernicus only
wanted to simplify astronomical theory and make it more accurate.
He found he could do this "by transferring to the sun many astro-
nomical functions previously attributed to the earth."34 Galileo
intended to advance no religious point of view in developing the tele-
scope. But he "popularized astronomy, and the astronomy that [he]
popularized was Copernican."35
Perhaps the indifference of scientists to the damaging effects
their discoveries can have on religious belief is as infuriating to some
religious persons as if scientists set out to do them harm. This ap-
pears true for the biological theory of evolution, which remains highly
controversial today. A recent news report disclosed that "[a] British
Amendment purposes, but the Supreme Court has never spoken authoritatively on
the issue.").
28. Examples of such scholarship appear in note 22, supra.
29. In "about 450 B.C., Anaxagoras shocked conservative opinion in Athens by
declaring that the sun and the moon were red-hot stones, which meant they could not
be divinities." S.G.F. Brandon, Origins of Religion, DICTIONARY OF THE HIsToRY OF
IDEAS, vol. IV, p. 93 (1973).
30. Numerous examples appear in THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONs, 3rd ed. (1996).
31. Scientists only choose problems that "can be assumed to have solutions.* **
One of the reasons why normal science seems to progress so rapidly is that its practi-
tioners concentrate on problems that only their own lack of ingenuity should keep
them from solving." Id. at 37.
32. THOMAS FLEMING, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN NATURE 9 (1988).
33. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION 2 (1957).
34. Id. at 1.
35. Id. at 225.
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film about Charles Darwin has failed to find a U.S. distributor be-
cause his theory of evolution is too controversial for American
audiences."36 The story went on to note that, according to a February
Gallup poll, "only 39% of Americans believe in evolution."37 This
seems to bear out the observation of a distinguished First Amend-
ment scholar that "there has been tremendous controversy
concerning the topic of human origins and how it should be taught in
the public schools."38 We might ask then a couple of questions. Is it
appropriate for the U.S. Supreme Court to consider the effect of its
decisions on the public? And, if so, has the Court done so here?
Like all judges serving under Article Three of the U. S. Constitu-
tion, justices of the Supreme Court are appointed rather than elected
and have their appointments for life. One can say that the strength of
the Supreme Court lies precisely in the fact that it is protected from
the wrath of public opinion and from the corresponding political pres-
sure felt by the legislative and executive branches of the federal
government. This does not mean however that the Court should be
unconcerned about public reaction to its decisions. In the words of
Alexander Bickel, "[b]road and sustained application of the Court's
law, when challenged, is a function of its rightness, not merely of its
pronouncement."3 9 The public is entitled to ask-and constantly does
ask-whether the Supreme Court's decisions improve society. The
Court cannot flee from controversy. But we should be able to find in
its controversial decisions vindication of clear principles that, to
many at least, make the price of public outcry worth paying. The
principles of racial equality in Brown v. Board of Education of To-
peka40 and of women's right to choose whether to have children in
Roe v. Wade41 are illustrations.
In contrast, the creationism cases have established little in the
nature of principle. The First Amendment restricts only government
action. It poses no ban on the teaching of creationism in private
schools or to home-schooled children. Creationism can be included in
even the public school curriculum. It is clear from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard that the Louisiana legisla-
ture would have been free to include a component on creationism is
part of a required course on comparative religious thought or on con-
temporary social issues.42
36. Anita Singh, Charles Darwin film 'too controversial' for religious America,
TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (September 11, 2009).
37. Id.
38. Conkle, The Religion Clauses, supra note 15, at 169.
39. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 258 (1962).
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. 482 U.S. at 593-594.
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Attempts to introduce creationism into the public school curricu-
lum failed in Edwards and elsewhere only because creationism was
to be taught as scientific fact. To be sure, it is commendable to protect
public school students from scientific misinformation. This has been
seen as an important contribution of the Court's creationism cases. 43
It is no more, however, than a fortunate side effect. We value public
education in this country.44 But, unlike freedom of expression, it does
not enjoy the status of a constitutional right.45 Even the most back-
ward secular misrepresentations in the public school curriculum-for
example about the dangerous effects of fluoridation, the nonexistence
of the Holocaust, or the historic absence of racial injustice46-Would
be unaffected by the Establishment Clause. They may not even be
unconstitutional.47
It would be difficult to argue with the Supreme Court's decision
in Epperson. If the Establishment Clause means anything beyond the
bare words of the text, it must mean that government may not insti-
tute religious bans on public education. Beyond Epperson, however,
the Establishment Clause principles become obscure and case results
episodic. Creationism teaching in the private school classroom is un-
abated. And, even in public schools, the prerequisite for
Establishment Clause application of a religious purpose leaves secu-
lar distortions of the curriculum unaddressed. If Edwards is not
wrong, at least it fails to advance or even articulate a principle that
justifies a result that many members of the public find disturbing.
43. See, e.g., Steven Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of American Science,1979 U.ILL.L.F. 1; Steven Jay Gould, Justice Scalia's Misunderstanding, 5 CONST.
COMMENT. 1 (1988).
44. "Education expresses what is, perhaps, our deepest wish: to continue, to go on,
to persist in the face of time. It is a program for social survival." MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 197 (1983).
45. The right to an education may be expressly secured elsewhere, e.g., Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Liberia, Article 5(c) (1986) (guaranteeing "educational
opportunities"); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26 (1948) ("Everyone
has the right to education.").
46. "I recall from my own childhood being taught in a public school of the District
of Columbia, as though there were no room for debate on the matter, that the slaves
in the antebellum South were essentially happy and had no desire to be free." Ste-
phen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as A Hobby, 1987
DUKE L.J. 977, 990. Professor Carter's conclusions on Supreme Court doctrine in crea-
tionist cases are generally in line with those advanced in this paper. I regret that I am
unable to give more attention to his excellent article.
47. Thus, Grimes v. Sobol, 832 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 19930, affd 37 F.3d 857 (2d
Cir. 1994), involved a challenge to the New York City public schools that the curricu-
lum presented an inaccurate and biased picture of African-Americans. The courts
ruled that, while inaccurate and biased, the curriculum withstood challenge under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because plaintiffs failed
to prove that defendants deliberately made the distortions to harm them and other
blacks. For an illuminating discussion of the Grimes case, see KEVIN BROWN, RACE,
LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA 265-266 (2005).
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